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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles require precise knowledge of
their position and orientation in all weather and traffic conditions
for path planning, perception, control, and general safe operation.
Here we derive these requirements for autonomous vehicles
based on first principles. We begin with the safety integrity
level, defining the allowable probability of failure per hour
of operation based on desired improvements on road safety
today. This draws comparisons with the localization integrity
levels required in aviation and rail where similar numbers are
derived at 10-8 probability of failure per hour of operation. We
then define the geometry of the problem, where the aim is to
maintain knowledge that the vehicle is within its lane and to
determine what road level it is on. Longitudinal, lateral, and
vertical localization error bounds (alert limits) and 95% accuracy
requirements are derived based on US road geometry standards
(lane width, curvature, and vertical clearance) and allowable
vehicle dimensions. For passenger vehicles operating on freeway
roads, the result is a required lateral error bound of 0.57 m
(0.20 m, 95%), a longitudinal bound of 1.40 m (0.48 m, 95%), a
vertical bound of 1.30 m (0.43 m, 95%), and an attitude bound in
each direction of 1.50 deg (0.51 deg, 95%). On local streets, the
road geometry makes requirements more stringent where lateral
and longitudinal error bounds of 0.29 m (0.10 m, 95%) are needed
with an orientation requirement of 0.50 deg (0.17 deg, 95%).
Index Terms—Autonomous vehicles, automated driving, local-
ization, positioning, requirements, safety, integrity
I. INTRODUCTION
THE challenge facing localization for autonomous systemsin terms of required accuracy and reliability at scale is
unprecedented. As will be shown, autonomous vehicles require
decimeter-level positioning for highway operation and near-
centimeter level for operation on local and residential streets.
These requirements stem from one goal: ensure that the vehicle
knows it is within its lane. Horizontally, this is broken down
by lateral (side-to-side) and longitudinal (forward-backward)
components. Vertically, the vehicle must know what road
level it is on when located among multi-level roads. At any
given time, the vehicle will have an estimate of its maximum
position error in each direction. These are known as protection
levels and are depicted in Figure 1. The maximum allowable
protection levels in each direction to ensure safe operation
are known as the alert limits. These alert limits are design
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Fig. 1. Definition of localization protection levels for automotive applications.
variables; in our case they need to be sufficiently small to
ensure that the vehicle stays within its lane at all times.
If the protection level is larger than the alert limit at any
given time, there is less certainty the vehicle will remain
within its lane. These bounds will be shown to be a function
of vehicle dimensions (length and width) along with road
geometry standards (lane width and curvature).
The challenge of decimeter location accuracy is put in
perspective by Table I which shows the progress in localization
throughout the last century [1]. In the early 1900s, the state of
the art were the tools used for navigation at sea. This consisted
of a sextant to measure latitude by the stars and a precise
mechanical clock known as a marine chronometer to measure
longitude. Combined, these sensors gave rise to approximately
3 km of position accuracy at sea [2]. The Second World War
accelerated the use of radio in navigation to support emerging
aviation operations. Air navigation was needed in all weather
in real-time. Land-based radio beacons were developed which
gave rise to approximately 500 meters of accuracy but this
required proximity to this infrastructure’s limited range [3]–
[5]. In the 1960s, the first satellite navigation system, Transit,
came online. Operated by the US Navy, Transit offered 25 me-
ters of accuracy, supporting the localization requirements of
Polaris ballistic missile submarines [6]–[8]. This system had
only a handful of satellites in low Earth orbit, resulting in
sometimes an hour or more to obtain a position fix. In the
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2TABLE I
EVOLUTION OF LOCALIZATION ACCURACY IN THE LAST CENTURY. BASED ON DATA FROM [1]–[9].
System Years Active Horizontal Accuracy [m] Latency Fix Type Coverage
Celestial / Chronometry 1770 – 1920 3,200 Hours 2D Global but not available when overcast
LORAN-C 1957 – 2010 460 None 2D North America, Europe, Pacific Rim
Transit 1964 – 1996 25 30 – 100 min 2D Global
GPS 1995 – Present 3 None 3D Global
Fig. 2. Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) levels of road vehicle autonomy (source: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration).
Fig. 3. Historical trend in widely available RMS position accuracy from a
variety of technologies. Compiled by the authors based on data from [2]–[12].
1990s, the Global Positioning System (GPS) came online, now
offering 1–5 meters of accuracy in open skies everywhere on
Earth in real-time [12], [13]. Figure 3 shows this progression
as a clear trend in the last century: an order of magnitude
increase in localization accuracy every 30 years. This predicts
the 2020s to be the first decade of the decimeter. As will be
shown here, we are well poised, as this trend is towards the
needs of autonomous vehicle operation.
Figure 2 shows the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE)
levels of vehicle autonomy [14]. Level 0 represents no automa-
tion where the driver is responsible for all aspects of driving
and exemplifies most vehicles up to approximately the 1970s.
Level 1 represents some driver assistance features for either
braking / throttle or steering but the driver is still expected
to monitor and control the vehicle. This includes features like
cruise control and Anti-lock Braking Systems (ABS). Level 2
is partial automation, where the human driver is responsible
for monitoring the scene and the system is responsible for
some dynamic driving tasks including lateral and longitudinal
motion (steering, propulsion, and braking). The human driver
must be ready to take over dynamic driving tasks immediately
when the driver determines the system is incapable. Examples
of level 2 systems are Tesla’s Autopilot released in 2014 and
General Motor’s Super Cruise released in 2017 [15], [16].
Level 3 is conditional automation, meaning that in certain
circumstances, the vehicle is within its Operational Design
Domain (ODD). The system is responsible for monitoring
the scene and dynamic driving tasks including lateral and
longitudinal motion (steering, propulsion, and braking). The
human driver must be ready to take over dynamic driving
tasks within a defined time when the system determines it’s
incapable or the vehicle is outside of its ODD and notifies
the driver. Level 4 is highly automated where the system
can perform all dynamic driving tasks within its ODD. This
mode of operation maybe geofenced to areas with appropriate
supporting infrastructure (e.g. maps and connectivity) and may
further be restricted to certain weather conditions. In 2018,
this represents largely research vehicles such as Waymo’s self-
driving minivan which is gearing towards initial ride-sharing
service [17]. Level 5 is full automation, where the vehicle is
capable of performing all dynamic driving tasks in all areas
and under all conditions.
Positioning accuracy requirements for connected vehicle
(V2X) applications have been previously broken down by
Basnayake et al. [18] into the categories of which-road
(<5 meters), which-lane (<1.5 meters), and where-in-lane
(<1.0 meter) based on the desired function or operation. The
National Highway Safety Administration (NHTSA) has, as
3part of its Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards in V2V
Communications, determined that position must be reported
to an accuracy of 1.5 meters (1σ or 68%) as this is tentatively
believed to provide lane-level information for safety applica-
tions [19]. Vehicle positioning requirements were further de-
veloped by Stephenson [20] who explored the Required Nav-
igation Performance (RNP) for Advanced Driver Assistance
Systems (ADAS) and automated driving. Stephenson added
the functional category of active vehicle control requiring an
accuracy better than 0.1 meters.
In this paper, we focus on full autonomous operation which
requires the accuracy needed for active control. In this context,
‘autonomous vehicle’ will refer to level 3+ systems, though
some of what is shown here can also be applied to level
2. The process followed to develop these requirements is
outlined in Figure 4. We begin with defining the statistics of
the problem by establishing a target level of safety. Following
methodologies developed in civil aviation, the target level of
safety is used to allocate appropriate integrity risk to each
element of the system including localization. Next, we define
the geometry of the problem to establish positioning bounds.
This will be shown to be a function of road geometry standards
such as lane widths and road curvature along with permissible
vehicle dimensions. This analysis will focus on road and
passenger vehicle standards in the United States, though the
same principles can be applied to other regions and vehicle
types.
In safety critical localization systems, the instantaneous
estimate of the maximum possible error in position is known
as the protection level. Figure 1 shows our definition of the
lateral, longitudinal, and vertical protection levels around the
vehicle. We define this as a box as this is a logical breakdown
for road vehicles, though other forms based on ellipsoids have
been proposed [21]. Some sensors and systems are better
at providing lateral information such as cameras which can
recognize lane lines and other types of sensors that can provide
longitudinal information such as wheel odometry. The hard
bounds on allowable lateral, longitudinal, and vertical protec-
tion levels are known as alert limits and are design choices
which are dictated by geometry. We will choose these such
that we always know we are within the lane. If our protection
level is larger than our alert limit we cannot guarantee we
are within the lane. Together, the desired integrity level and
geometric bounds define the requirements of localization as a
system.
Safety-critical localization systems specify their perfor-
mance in terms of accuracy, integrity, and availability. Avail-
ability is a measure of how often our protection levels are
larger than our alert limits. If we are always within the
maximum permissible error (alert limits), we have 100%
availability. If we do so only some of the time, we have
only limited availability. As a system, when operating in
autonomous mode, localization must always be available.
On the flip side, localization availability could be one of
the metrics used to determine if the vehicle is within its
Operational Design Domain to enable autonomous features.
This could be a function of where high definition maps or
other forms of supporting infrastructure are present.
Fig. 4. Our approach to developing localization requirements for autonomous
vehicles. We derive system integrity risk allocation based on a target level
of safety. This risk budget is then distributed throughout the autonomous
vehicle system, following methodologies developed in civil aviation. We
define the geometry of the problem to establish positioning bounds based on
vehicle dimensions and road geometry. Combining these defines the desired
distribution of our position errors and the localization requirements.
Integrity describes how often our true error is outside of
our estimate of maximum possible error or protection level.
Outside of this and hazardous information is being fed to the
vehicle’s decision making and control systems. This is the
probability of system failure, usually specified as probability
of failure per hour of operation. We will derive the require-
ment on integrity based on the desired level of road safety.
This will specify a level which represents improvement in
road safety today by drawing comparisons to safety levels
achieved in commercial aviation. We will also tie this integrity
number to existing design safety standards in automotive and
other industries. Figures 5 and 6 summarize the relationship
between protection level, alert limit, availability, misleading
information, and hazardous misleading information. These will
4(a) Case I: PL < AL along with examples of nominal, misleading,
and hazardous misleading information.
(b) Case II: AL < PL resulting in no availability.
Fig. 5. Relationship between protection level, alert limit, availability, and
different operations.
be developed in more detail throughout the text.
Accuracy is described by the typical performance of the
system, usually measured at the 95th percentile. This is a
manifestation of the desired statistical distribution of local-
ization errors, where alert limits usually define the maximum
allowable error for operation to the desired integrity level
which define the tails of the statistical distribution. Hence,
accuracy is a measure of nominal performance and integrity a
measure of the limits. This relationship is shown in Figure 4.
At present, there is no one localization technology that can
meet the requirements presented here for safe operation in all
weather, road, and traffic scenarios. Today, Ford Motor Com-
pany’s autonomous vehicle research platform makes use of a
complex sensor fusion strategy for localization and perception
as shown in Figure 7. This includes LiDAR, radar, cameras,
a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, and
an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU). Each of these are a
system in itself, and hence localization is a system of systems.
Since no one technology can achieve the requirements in
all scenarios, this will require multi-modal sensing and their
Fig. 6. The Stanford Diagram. This shows the relationship between actual
error, protection level, and alert limit.
Fig. 7. Example of Ford’s research autonomous vehicle platform sensors used
in localization and perception.
intelligent combination to achieve the integrity levels needed
for safe operation.
Though the sensor strategy shown in Figure 7 can meet
many of the requirements that will be developed here in a
research setting, the sensor costs are such that many challenges
lie ahead on the path to production. Decimeter accuracy
will require a trade-off between onboard sensors, compute
resources / storage, and supporting infrastructure such as high
definition maps and GNSS corrections. Such infrastructure
may also limit where self-driving features are enabled due to
availability of precise localization. Ultimately, precise vehicle
location is only useful in context and hence a-priori maps are a
major piece of the puzzle. We will limit the scope of this paper
to localization requirements as mapping is a vast and complex
area in its own right. We will touch on mapping requirements
as they relate to localization.
5II. INTEGRITY
In 2016, there were 34,439 fatal car crashes in the United
States, resulting in 37,461 fatalities [22], [23]. On a per mile
basis, this is 1.18 fatalities per 100 million miles traveled
(1.18×10-8 fatalities / mile) [23]. The cause of vehicle crashes
are estimated as follows: 94%(±2.2%) from human driver
errors; 2%(±0.7%) from electrical and mechanical component
failures; 2%(±1.3%) from environmental factors contributing
to slick (low µ) roads such as water, ice, snow, etc.; and
2%(±1.4%) from unknown reasons [24]. In total, road fatali-
ties account for 95% of all transportation related fatalities in
the United States where 2% come from rail, 2% from water
transport, and 1% from aviation [23]. Though the number
of fatalities per road mile has decreased by five-fold since
the 1960s, it has remained relatively constant over the last
decade [23], [25].
Figure 8 compares fatalities on the road with commercial
aviation on a per vehicle mile basis between 1960 – 2015 in
the US. This shows that between 2010 – 2015, commercial
aviation averaged 2.50×10-10 fatalities per mile, making air
travel nearly two orders of magnitude safer than road travel
when using this metric. Improvements in road safety are being
proposed through automation, where sensors, silicon, and
software are being combined into a virtual driver system which
aims to perform many of the tasks of the human driver today.
The first generation of commercially available virtual driver
systems must be safer than the human drivers they aim to
replace if they are to be socially accepted. Vehicle component
failures are currently responsible for only 2% of crashes [24].
If this same metric is upheld for virtual driver systems which
aim to replace the human factors representing 94% of crash
causation today, then we strive to achieve roughly two orders
of magnitude improvement in road safety. This brings the
necessary system requirements for autonomous road vehicles
up to the levels mandated in civil aviation, an industry known
for its safety achieved through strict training for air and ground
crew, supporting infrastructure, and well-developed standards.
Fig. 8. Fatalities per vehicle mile 1960 – 2015 for road vehicles and
commercial aviation in the US. Based on data from [23].
Fig. 9. Ratio of fatal accidents (crashes) to total reported accidents (crashes)
between 1960 – 2015 for road vehicles and commercial aviation in the US.
Based on data from [23] where data for road vehicles was only available
from 1990 onward. In some recent years, commercial aviation saw no fatal
accidents and hence the appearance of missing data.
Our starting point for this analysis will be the goal of a one
hundred times improvement in road safety through the virtual
driver system. This is the level of commercial aviation today
at 2.50×10-10 fatalities per mile and hence will be our target.
To put this in units of fatal crashes per road vehicle mile, we
must divide by the ratio of fatalities to fatal crashes which
in 2016 was 37,461/34,439 = 1.09 [23]. Being conservative,
this leads to a target level of safety of TLS = 2×10-10 fatal
crashes per vehicle mile. To translate this into system level
requirements, we must examine both historical data and the
autonomous vehicle architecture, an approach mirroring that
taken in civil aviation [26].
Figure 10 shows the system breakdown of the autonomous
vehicle including the virtual driver and other vehicle modules.
Furthermore, it shows one possible of allocation of integrity
risk across individual elements with an end target level of
safety of TLS = 2×10-10 fatal crashes / vehicle mile. To arrive
at this distribution, we must work backwards from the TLS.
We must first account for the fact that not every malfunction
will directly lead to a hazard that will cause a fatal crash. Some
failures may only lead to a lane departure or minor crash. In
aviation, this fatal accident to incident ratio PF :I is taken as
1:10 [27], [28], and Figure 9 shows why. This plot shows the
yearly ratio of fatal to total reported accidents for commercial
aviation and road transport. Aviation is shown to be 1:14 and
automotive 1:172. This is not unexpected, due to the higher
speed of operation of aircraft and consequently, the severity of
crashes. Based on this historical data, we have conservatively
chosen the automotive fatal crash to incident ratio as PF :I =
10-2 fatal crashes / failure, meaning one fatal crash for every
one hundred incidents where an incident could be seen as a
lane departure or minor crash.
Our chosen fatal crash to incident ratio is conservative,
since this number represents the ratio of fatal crashes to all
police reported crashes, not necessarily to all incidents. The
6Fig. 10. Virtual driver system integrity risk allocation. Unless otherwise indicated, values are given as failures per mile. This diagram makes certain assumptions
about how faults cascade through the system. For example, failures in localization output are assumed to lead directly to failures in planning though planning
can also have its own independent failures as well. The target level of safety is derived based on numbers achieved in practice in aviation between 2010 -
2015. The fatal crash to incident ratio is based on historical road data from [23] (see Figure 9).
crash data in commercial aviation is generally reliable due
to the strict reporting requirements. In automotive, this is
less so, as not all minor crashes are reported. It is estimated
that 60% of property-damage-only crashes and 24% of all
injury crashes are not reported to the police [29]. Furthermore,
the data supports that the 1 fatal crash for every 100 police
reported crashes is consistent between functional road types,
e.g. interstate and local urban roads, at least to within a factor
of 2 – 3 [30], [31]. Hence, we believe we are within an order
of magnitude with this estimate for the majority of driving
scenarios.
The next step is to allocate the acceptable level of integrity
risk to vehicle systems Pveh and to the virtual driver system
Pvds. These are related to the target level of safety TLS and
fatal crash to incident ratio PF :I as follows:
(1)TLS = PF :I (Pveh + Pvds)
To reach our TLS = 2×10-10 fatal crashes / vehicle mile,
we will allocate equal integrity risk to both the virtual driver
and vehicle systems. This works out to Pvds = Pveh =
10-8 failures / mile and is reflected in Figure 10. For clarity,
plugging in these values into equation (1) gives the desired
result:
(2)
TLS = PF :I (Pveh + Pvds)
= 10−2
fatal crashes
failure
(
10−8 + 10−8
) failure
mile
= 2× 10−10 fatal crashes/mile
Examination of historical data reveals that vehicle system
failure rates Pveh are very nearly 10-8 failures / mile today.
This can be estimated through police reported crashes, NHTSA
estimates of crash causation due to vehicle systems, and
the number of vehicle miles driven. On average, between
2010 – 2015 there was 5,800,000 police reported crashes per
year on US roads [23]. These crashes are the rounded sum
of fatal crashes, an actual count from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System, injury crashes, and property damage only
crashes, which are estimates from the National Automotive
Sampling System-General Estimates System [23]. Currently,
NHTSA estimates 2%(±0.7%) of these crashes to be caused
by vehicle systems [24]. Using this, along with the fact that
3,005,829,000,000 miles were driven on average in the US
between 2010 – 2015, we can obtain an estimate of historical
failure rate Pˆveh:
(3)Pˆveh =
5, 800, 000 crashes
3, 005, 829, 000, 000 miles
× 2%
= 3.8× 10−8 failures/mile
Though there are sources of uncertainty in each of the values
used above, this shows that vehicle systems are at the proposed
order of magnitude, indicating that 10-8 failures / mile can
likely be attained if it is not already.
Achieving the desired integrity risk for the virtual driver
system Pvds will require a closer look at its subsystems. In
our case, we are focused on localization. Localization will
need to have a lower probability of failure since it feeds other
elements of the virtual driver system. This includes hardware
and software failures within perception, localization, planning,
and control. Figure 10 shows the internal elements of the
virtual driver system and the importance of localization within
the system. The output of localization is an input to planning,
and the output of planning is the input to control, therefore
failures in localization propagate downstream. One possible
allocation of integrity risk to all virtual driver subsystems is
shown in Figure 10 where localization is targeted at Ploc =
10-9 failures / mile. This diagram assumes that failures at
any given point downstream are a combination of upstream
input failures along with failures of the given subsystem. Ploc
is typically referred to as the probability of the localization
7TABLE II
LOCALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR MARITIME, AVIATION, AND RAIL.
Transport Mode Operation
Accuracy
(95%)
[m]
Alert
Limit
[m]
Probability
of Failure
Maritime [33]
Open Ocean,
Coastal 10
** 25** 10-5 / 3 h
Port,
Hydrography,
Drilling
1** 2.5** 10-5 / 3 h
Aviation [28], [34]
LPV 200 Air-
port Approach 4
* 35* 10-7 / 150 s
CAT II / III
Instrument
Landing
2.9* 5* 10-9 / 150 s
Rail [35]
Train control - 20** 10-9 / h
Parallel track
discrimination - 2.5
** 10-9 / h
*Vertical
**Horizontal
system outputting hazardous misleading information (as de-
scribed in Section I). To get this in terms of failures per hour
of operation (a more common unit), we first need to determine
the vehicle speed range. Maximum speed limits in the US are
found in Texas at 85 mph (137 km/h). On the lower side, we
will consider the minimum speed at which airbags will deploy,
which corresponds to 10 mph (16 km/h) [32]. These speeds
give the following range:
(4)
Ploc = 10
−9 failures
mile
× (10− 85) mile
hour
≈ 10−8 failures
hour
In this analysis of the localization system, we will examine
an allowable integrity risk of 10-8 failures / hour of operation.
This is the requirement on the localization system as a whole,
which itself may be comprised of several subsystems, sensors,
and independent localization algorithms based on GNSS, IMU,
cameras, LiDAR, maps, and other elements. This is the number
that must be achieved in all weather and traffic scenarios where
the vehicle intends operation. The gold standard from ISO
26262 for automotive functional safety is 10 Failures In Time
(FIT) which corresponds to 10 failures in one billion hours
of operation or 10-8 failures / hour of operation. This aligns
with our intended target. This is Automotive Safety Integrity
Level (ASIL) D, the highest standard for current automobiles.
Though the error distribution of the localization system may
not be Gaussian, when thinking of this in Gaussian terms,
(1 – 10-8) is 99.999999% or approximately 5.73σ.
The localization requirements in maritime [33], avia-
tion [27], [28], [34], and rail [35], [36] for specific operations
are given in Table II for comparison. Here, we specify the 95%
localization accuracy, the alert limit which is the hard bound
on position error to ensure safe operation, and the acceptable
probability of system failure or integrity risk. In aviation,
the operations given correspond to airport precision approach
TABLE III
TYPICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF SAFETY RISK BASED ON DATA
FROM [38]–[42].
Category Safety Consequence of Failure
Integrity
Level
(SIL)
Catastrophic 4 Loss of multiple lives
Critical 3 Loss of a single life
Marginal 2 Major injuries to one or more persons
Negligible 1 Material damage, at most minor injuries
No Consequence 0 No damages, except user dissatisfaction
TABLE IV
APPROXIMATE CROSS-DOMAIN MAPPING OF SAFETY LEVELS BASED ON
DATA FROM [38]–[43].
Probability General Automotive Aviation Railway
of Failure Programmable ISO 26262 DO-178/254 CENELEC
per Hour Electronics 50126
IEC-61508 128/129
- (SIL-0) QM DAL-E (SIL-0)
10-6 10-5 SIL-1 ASIL-A DAL-D SIL-1
10-7 10-6 SIL-2 ASIL-B/C DAL-C SIL-2
10-8 10-7 SIL-3 ASIL-D DAL-B SIL-3
10-9 10-8 SIL-4 - DAL-A SIL-4
and landing. The timescale associated with probability of
failure of 150 seconds corresponds to the typical time this
operation takes. Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance
(LPV 200) gets the aircraft down to a decision height of
200 feet (61 m) above the runway where the pilot can decide
to either land the aircraft or fly around and make another
approach. CAT II / III is full instrument landing and hence
the two orders of magnitude difference in acceptable failure
rate since the system is fully automated. Maritime operations
happen at lower speeds and is why integrity is specified over
3 hours. However, it can be shown that 10-5 failures per 3 hours
is roughly equivalent to aircraft precision approach require-
ments at 10-7 failures per 150 seconds [37]. Rail has sep-
arate along-track and cross-track requirements. Along-track
requirements describe where trains are along a given track
known as train control. Cross-track requirements are needed to
distinguish which track the train is on known as parallel track
discrimination. Track discrimination requirements are most
strict since the inter-track spacing is tighter than the spacing
kept between trains on the same line. Both rail operations
require a failure rate of 10-9 failures / hour of operation.
For the virtual driver localization system, we are aiming for
10-8 failures / hour or better since the virtual driver system
itself will be designed to ASIL-D standards. Though this
target integrity level has precedence in other transportation
industries, the required alert limits do not. We will show in
the coming sections that alert limits needed for road vehicles
is on the order of decimeters, an order of magnitude smaller
than anything in Table II.
To put probability of failure per hour of operation in
context, we will compare it to safety standards across dif-
ferent industries. Table III shows the typical breakdown of
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) by hazard category. The strictest
8level (SIL-4) occurs where the consequence of failure is the
loss of multiple human lives. The more lenient level, SIL-0,
represent cases where the consequence of failure is only some
dissatisfaction or discomfort. Table IV shows an approximate
cross-domain mapping of aviation, rail, general programmable
electronics, and automotive safety integrity levels. In rail,
aviation, and programmable electronics, the strictest levels are
those corresponding to failures which could cause the loss
of multiple human lives and correspond to an integrity level
of 10-9 failures / hour. In rail and electronics this is SIL-4.
In aviation, this is Design Assurance Level (DAL) A. The
automotive industry’s strictest requirement, Automotive Safety
Integrity Level (ASIL) D is closer to SIL-3 and DAL-B in
practice or 10-8 – 10-7 failures / hour [43]. We’re targeting
10-8 failures / hour for the localization system, putting us
in the range of ASIL-D. The virtual driver system will also
be designed to ASIL-D standards, and hence it follows that
subsystems like localization need to comply with this standard.
III. HORIZONTAL REQUIREMENTS
The horizontal localization requirements for autonomous
vehicles are a function of their physical dimensions and
the road geometry. The goal is to keep the vehicle in its
respective lane during typical operation. This leads to lateral
and longitudinal localization requirements as shown in Figure
11a. To scale, this shows the lateral clearance that can be
expected with a mid-size sedan (e.g. a Ford Fusion) on a
straight stretch of US freeway. This makes it appear as though
lateral and longitudinal requirements are decoupled, but this is
not entirely the case. Figure 11b shows the coupling between
these directions in turns, hence road curvature causes coupling
between requirements in lateral and longitudinal directions.
The analysis presented here will be focused on standards
within the United States where assumptions will be made
about typical vehicle width wv , vehicle length lv , road width
w, and road radius of curvature r. A similar analysis could be
undertaken with road and vehicle standards of other regions.
TABLE V
VEHICLE DIMENSION STANDARDS IN THE US [44], [45].
Vehicle Type Width [m] Length [m] Height [m]
Passenger (P) 2.1 5.8 1.3
Single Unit Truck (SU) 2.4 9.2 3.4 - 4.1
City Bus 2.6 12.2 3.2
Semitrailer 2.4 - 2.6 13.9 - 22.4 4.1
We will begin with vehicle dimensions. Standards for road
vehicle dimensions in the US are summarized in Table V
and reflect maximum dimensions for different vehicle classes.
A more detailed breakdown for some example passenger (P)
vehicles is given in Table VI. This ranges from the subcompact
to large 6-wheel ‘dualie’ pickup trucks though the latter
technically falls into the single unit truck (SU) category. As
will be discussed, not all vehicles are meant for all roads,
and hence some care must be taken when developing the
localization requirements for vehicles. For example, semi-
trucks are not meant to be driven on residential streets and
(a) Straight road.
(b) Curved road.
Fig. 11. Bounding box required for localization broken down by lateral and
longitudinal components.
TABLE VI
TYPICAL VEHICLE DIMENSIONS.
Vehicle Type Example* Width [m] Length [m] Height [m]
Subcompact Fiesta 1.72 4.06 1.48
Compact Focus 1.82 4.54 1.47
Mid-Size Fusion 1.85 4.87 1.48
Full-Size Taurus 1.94 5.15 1.54
Crossover Escape 1.84 4.52 1.68
Small SUV Edge 1.93 4.78 1.74
Standard SUV Explorer 2.00 5.04 1.78
Van Transit 2.07-2.13** 5.59-6.70** 2.09-2.76**
Pickup Truck F-series 2.03-2.43** 5.32-6.76** 2.06
*Based on 2018 Ford model year.
**The wider F-series trucks & Transits are dual wheeled or ‘dualies.’
hence requirements should not be set to roadways that are
impossible for such a vehicle to navigate. Here, we will focus
on passenger vehicles.
Next is road geometry. Road curvature is a function of
design speed and is based on limiting values of side friction
factor f and superelevation e [44]. Superelevation is the
rotation of the pavement on the approach to and throughout a
horizontal curve and is intended to help the driver by counter-
ing the lateral acceleration produced by tracking the curve.
The other important factor is road width, which typically
ranges from 3.6 meters on standard freeways to 2.7 meters
on limited residential streets [44]. Road width and curvature
are the elements that define the localization requirements to
ensure the vehicle knows it is within its lane to the certainty
level defined in Section II. The limiting cases for each road
type have been assembled in Table VII for passenger type (P)
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SOME LIMITING ROAD DESIGN ELEMENTS, BASED ON DESIGNS FOR
PASSENGER (P) VEHICLES. BASED ON DATA FROM [44], [46], [47].
Road Type
Design
Speed
[km/h]
Lane Width
[m]
Minimum
Radius [m]
Freeway 80 - 130 3.6 195**
Interchanges 30 - 110 3.6 - 5.4 150 - 15
Arterial 50 - 100 3.3 - 3.6 70**
Collector 50 3.0 - 3.6 70**
Local 20 - 50 2.7* - 3.6 10**
Hairpin Turn /
Cul-de-Sac < 20 6.0 7
Single Lane
Roundabout < 20 4.3 11
*The lower bound of 2.7 m is the exception, not the rule, and is typically
reserved for residential streets with low traffic volumes.
**Based on design speeds and limiting values of rate of roadway
superelevation e and coefficient of friction f .
Fig. 12. Bounding box geometry in a turn. This shows the allowable
maximum position error of the vehicle to ensure it is within the lane known
as the alert limits.
vehicles.
The relationship between the road width and curvature and
the interior bounding box around the vehicle is shown in Fig-
ure 12. The relationship between the lateral and longitudinal
bounds is found by Pythagoras:(y
2
)2
+
(
r − w
2
+ x
)2
=
(
r +
w
2
)2
(5)
Solving for x results in:
x =
√(
r +
w
2
)2
−
(y
2
)2
+
w
2
− r (6)
This allows us to determine the dimensions of the bounding
box given the road geometry. In turn, given the vehicle
Fig. 13. Lateral and longitudinal alert limit trade off for freeway and
interchange geometry and passenger vehicle dimension limits. This is limited
by lane widths of 3.6 meters with a minimum curvature of 150 meters.
dimensions, corresponding maximum permissible lateral and
longitudinal errors (alert limits) can be derived. Lateral and
longitudinal alert limits are a trade-off and there is a certain
budget between them which is dependent on the road type.
The lateral localization requirements are coupled to longitu-
dinal through the allowed curvature and width of the road.
For example, on the highway at high speed, the allowable
road curvature is minimal and roads are fairly straight. This
allows for the bounding box length to be large longitudinally
before lateral requirements are overly constrained. Ultimately,
choosing length y fixes width x or vice versa, and the resulting
lateral and longitudinal alert limits are related to the vehicle
length lv and width wv as follows:
Lateral Alert Limit = (x− wv) /2
Longitudinal Alert Limit = (y − lv) /2
(7)
Using equations (6) and (7), the trade-off between lateral
and longitudinal alert limits for freeways assuming passenger
vehicle design limits is shown in Figure 13. This shows that
as the longitudinal requirements are relaxed to several meters,
the lateral requirements become more stringent. However,
ultimately on/off ramps must be found within a reasonable
tolerance on the freeway, so there is a more stringent longi-
tudinal requirement based on vehicle operation. This is also
constrained by situations where vehicles may be operating
collaboratively and sharing their location via communications
channels (V2X) [21]. In this design study, we limit the
longitudinal alert limit to be less than half the length of
a subcompact vehicle or 1.5 meters, well within the limits
of reasonable highway following distances (even with the
combined errors of two vehicles operating collaboratively) and
the vehicle’s ability to appropriately find on/off-ramps. With
this longitudinal design number, we use Figure 13 to determine
the required lateral alert limit to be 0.72 meters. The lateral
alert limit for other vehicle types is summarized in Table VIII.
On the highway, lateral dominates the requirements since
the coupling with curvature is negligible and is approximately
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Fig. 14. Lateral and longitudinal alert limit trade off for local road geometry
and passenger vehicle dimension limits. Narrow streets are assumed to be
3.0 meters wide with a minimum curvature of 20 meters or 3.3 meters wide
with minimum curvature of 10 meters. Single lane roundabouts and hairpin /
cul-de-sac geometry is included for comparison.
1 centimeter over the length of the largest pickup trucks.
Hence, on the highway, the longitudinal alert limit is to some
extent a design parameter. On local streets, with sharp turns,
the curvature coupling results in tighter requirements in both
directions. Figure 14 shows the trade-off between lateral and
longitudinal alert limits for local road geometry for passenger
vehicle limits. In this plot, we restrict the analysis to roads
3.3 meters wide with a curvature of 10 meters and 3.0 meters
wide with a curvature of 20 meters. Also shown are the results
for single lane roundabouts and hairpin turns. Though Table
VII shows that some roads can be as narrow as 2.7 meters,
this is the exception not the rule and we felt it too restricting
to limit requirements based on this number. In addition, roads
with tight curvature usually have wider lanes to accommodate
as shown by the design recommendations for single lane
roundabouts and hairpin turns / cul-de-sacs. Hence, these
requirements are still conservative when neglecting 2.7 meters
wide lanes [47].
For local streets, Figure 14 shows the trade-off between
lateral and longitudinal alert limits. Thinking of limiting cases
where vehicles are negotiating 90 degree turns, it seems logical
that both directions become equally important to properly
complete the maneuver, so the alert limits should be balanced
equally in both directions. Figure 14 shows the equality point
to be 0.33 meters for both the lateral and longitudinal alert lim-
its for the largest passenger vehicles. Other vehicle types are
summarized in Table VIII. For scale, when operating in urban
environments, 0.33 meters is also the minimum width of stop
lines which are mandated to be between 0.3 and 0.6 meters
(12 - 24 inches) [48].
IV. VERTICAL REQUIREMENTS
The recommended minimum vertical clearance for roads in
the US is 4.4 meters (14.5 feet) [25]. This standard drives
the permissible vertical height, including load, to be between
Fig. 15. Example of a multi-level interchange in Phoenix, AZ. The ‘Mini
Stack’ is at the intersection of Interstate 10, State Route 51, and Loop 202.
4.1 meters (13.5 feet) and 4.3 meters (14.5 feet), though
this varies somewhat by state [44], [45]. Hence to reliably
determine which road level we are on of an interchange for
example, we must know our position to a fraction of this
clearance height. Bounding our vertical position to ± half
of this clearance is insufficient since this leaves a potential
ambiguity on multi-decked roads or interchanges. An example
of such an interchange is the ‘Mini Stack’ in Phoenix, Arizona
shown in Figure 15. This multi-level interchange is at the
intersection of Interstate 10, State Route 51, and Loop 202. For
certainty, one-third of the minimum vertical clearance should
be sufficient to resolve the ambiguity of which road level the
vehicle is on. Hence the required Vertical Alert Limit (VAL)
is:
VAL =
min. vertical clearance
3
=
4.4 m
3
= 1.47 m (8)
Here, the vertical alert limit is vehicle independent (i.e. not
dependent on vehicle dimensions) since it is used only to
determine the road level. This differs from horizontal require-
ments developed in Section III which strive to maintain a
vehicle of certain dimensions within the bounds of the lane.
This is reflected in Table VIII which summarizes the lateral,
longitudinal, and vertical alert limits for several vehicle types
and different road operations including freeways / interchanges
and local roads.
It should be noted that this vertical positioning analysis has
some limitations. As this analysis is seen as the far reaching
goal for highly automated systems, the assumption here is
that the vehicle will have a form of map to help in resolving
position. In the interim, other applications such as V2X will
likely not have maps. In the V2X scenario, the limiting factor
for the vertical requirement is the trajectory estimation to
determine whether or not a principal other vehicle is on a
collision path with the subject vehicle. That is, elevation error
will make a grade-separate interaction appear to be an at-
grade crossing with collision potential. This is a more complex
analysis to perform which is outside the scope of this paper.
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TABLE VIII
HORIZONTAL (LATERAL / LONGITUDINAL) AND VERTICAL LOCALIZATION
ALERT LIMIT REQUIREMENTS FOR US FREEWAYS AND LOCAL ROADS.
Vehicle Type
Local Roads Freeways & Interchanges
Lat.
[m]
Long.
[m]
Vert.
[m]
Lat.
[m]
Long.
[m]
Vert.
[m]
Mid-Size 0.48 0.48 1.47 0.85 1.50 1.47
Full-Size 0.42 0.42 1.47 0.80 1.50 1.47
Standard Pickup 0.38 0.38 1.47 0.76 1.50 1.47
Passenger Vehicle
Limits 0.33 0.33 1.47 0.72 1.50 1.47
6-Wheel Pickup - - - 0.56 1.50 1.47
V. ORIENTATION REQUIREMENTS
The horizontal and vertical alert limits discussed so far are
the acceptable limit for all combined sources of error. As will
be discussed in this section, this will include errors in both
positioning and attitude (orientation). The vehicle attitude is
described in terms of its roll θ, pitch φ, and heading ψ angles.
Errors in these parameters will rotate the position protection
level box around the vehicle and result in a larger effective
protection level. This effect is shown in Figure 16. This shows
how errors in heading and position map to a larger combined
protection level area and hence why knowledge of attitude
error is important.
Fig. 16. Combined effect of lateral / longitudinal position and heading errors
on overall protection level. Heading errors rotate position errors and lead to
a larger effective area of uncertainty.
This effect leads to requirements on acceptable errors in roll,
pitch, and heading as well as position. We will begin with
mapping errors in position and orientation into a combined
protection level. Assuming a box around the vehicle of width
x, length y, and height z (following the notation of Figure 12),
maximum errors in roll ±δθ, pitch ±δφ, and heading ±δψ
angles are mapped through the following Euler sequence:
x′ = R3 (±δψ)R2 (±δθ)R3 (±δφ)x (9)
where x is the dimensions of the box [x, y, z]T reflecting
position protection level, x′ is the dimensions of the inflated
box [x′, y′, z′]T representing the protection level from both
positioning and orientation, and Ri are the following rotation
matrices:
R1 (±δφ) =
1 0 00 cos(±δφ) − sin(±δφ)
0 sin(±δφ) cos(±δφ)
 (10)
R2 (±δθ) =
 cos(±δθ) 0 sin(±δθ)0 1 0
− sin(±δθ) 0 cos(±δθ)
 (11)
R3 (±δψ) =
cos(±δψ) − sin(±δψ) 0sin(±δψ) cos(±δψ) 0
0 0 1
 (12)
The position protection level x is related to errors in lateral
δlat, longitudinal δlon, and vertical δvert positioning as follow:
x =
xy
z
 =
wv + 2δlatlv + 2δlon
2δvert
 (13)
We are after the worst-case error bounds, which are ob-
tained by letting all the terms constructively add by setting
cos(±δ·) → cos(δ·) and ± sin(±δ·) → sin(δ·). By necessity,
errors in orientation will also have to be small, meaning δθ,
δφ, and δψ will be 1 radian (57 degrees). This allows us to
make a small angle approximation to simplify these equations,
where cos(δ·) → 1 and sin(δ·) → δ·. Multiplying out and
neglecting higher order terms results in the following:
x′ =
 1 δψ δθδψ 1 δφ
δθ δφ 1
x (14)
Combining equations (13) and (14) along with our definition
of protection levels given by Figure 1 (where now Lat. PL =
(x′ − wv)/2, Lon. PL = (y′ − lv)/2, and VPL = z′/2) gives
the combined protection level as a function of position and
orientation errors:
Lat. PL = δlat + (δlon + lv/2) δψ + δvertδθ
Lon. PL = δlon + (δlat + wv/2) δψ + δvertδφ
VPL = δvert + (δlat + wv/2) δθ + (δlon + lv/2) δφ
(15)
To give a sense of how the above equations scale, Figure
17 shows the lateral, longitudinal, and vertical protection level
inflation as a function of attitude error for the freeway alert
limits given in Table VIII. This assumes the same angular error
in each direction and shows how quickly these inflate our
protection levels. The allocation of position and orientation
error budgets is ultimately a design choice which will be
examined in more detail in Section VII.
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Fig. 17. Example of protection level inflation as a function of attitude
error (on all axes). This assumes passenger vehicle design limits and the
highway/interchange alert limits given in Table VIII.
VI. UPDATE FREQUENCY
The time required between successive localization updates
(latency) is a function of the vehicle speed and road geometry.
The longer the update interval, the larger the distance between
localization updates. For example, at 100 km/h (62 mph),
10 Hz gives localization updates 2.7 meters apart, the lane
width of some local streets. At 130 km/h (80 mph), 10 Hz
yields 3.6 meters between successive updates, the width
of a freeway lane. The relationship between vehicle speed,
sampling rate, and the distance between samples is given in
Figure 18. A lag in position update leads directly to further
uncertainty in localization, predominantly in the longitudinal
direction. Hence this lag must be managed such that it does
not become a dominant factor.
Fig. 18. The relationship between sample rate, speed, and distance between
samples.
Section III showed that highway operation requires a lon-
gitudinal protection level of 1.5 meters. At highway speeds
of up to 130 km/h (80 mph), 100 Hz gives rise to 0.36 meter
spacing between successive position updates and 200 Hz gives
0.17 meters. This drives our requirement since we want the
contribution of this uncertainty to be only a small component
of our protection level. An update of 200 Hz corresponds to
a successive point spacing one tenth of our chosen alert limit
and seems most appropriate. An update of 200 Hz may seem
fast for localization technologies, where LiDAR and GNSS
typically output position updates at 10 – 20 Hz, but when
combined with an inertial measurement unit (IMU), rates of
200 Hz can be achieved. This requirement is ultimately that
on the system as a whole, not each piece individually.
The update rate can be throttled based on speed, slowing
during low speed driving to save compute and power, and to
increase range. For example, at 100 km/h (62 mph) on the
freeway, one-tenth the longitudinal alert limit can be achieved
at 150 Hz. However, as was shown in Section III, operation
on local streets requires tighter requirements. Even on local
streets where sharp turns are taken at 15 km/h (10 mph), we
require our alert limit to be 0.33 meters, one tenth of this
number at this speed corresponds to 125 Hz. Hence, 100 Hz
or greater appears to be the appropriate update rate for both
highway and local street operation.
VII. LOCALIZATION REQUIREMENTS DESIGN
In this section we will summarize the design process for
allocating localization requirements. This balances allowable
errors in position and attitude. The results are summarized in
Tables IX and X.
Our design equations are based on (15), where we require
protection levels ≤ alert limits. This guarantees knowledge
that we are within the desired lane and on the appropriate
road level to the degree of safety needed for operation. These
design equations are as follows:
δlat + (δlon + lv/2) δψ + δvertδθ ≤ Lat. AL
δlon + (δlat + wv/2) δψ + δvertδφ ≤ Lon. AL
δvert + (δlat + wv/2) δθ + (δlon + lv/2) δφ ≤ VAL
(16)
In the above, our protection levels are written as a function
of both position and orientation errors as developed in Sec-
tion V. These coupled equations must satisfy the constraints
developed in Sections III and IV, which describe the total
allowable lateral, longitudinal, and vertical errors (alert limits)
as a function of the road geometry and vehicle dimensions.
These alert limits are summarized in Table VIII.
We are most constrained in horizontal components, espe-
cially the lateral direction, so we will use this as our driving
constraint equation. Assuming angular errors are allowed to
be the same in each direction, namely δθ = δφ = δψ = δλ,
the lateral component of (16) simplifies to:
δlat + (δlon + δvert + lv/2) δλ ≤ Lat. AL (17)
Section III showed that for passenger vehicle limits, the sum of
allowable longitudinal and vertical errors for freeway operation
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turns out to be approximately half the vehicle length lv/2, so
a good rule of thumb is:
δlat + lvδλ ≤ Lat. AL (18)
Since the limiting lv for passenger vehicles is 5.8 meters
and the lateral alert limit was set at 0.72 meters for freeway
operation (see Table VIII), the acceptable error in orientation
δλ must be less than 0.1 radians (5.73 degrees) otherwise we
quickly exceed this limit. A reasonable choice for δλ seems
to be an orientation error of 1.5 degrees (0.03 radians) which
leads to a contribution of 0.15 meters when scaled by lv .
This leads to a required lateral positioning error δlat limit of
0.57 meters to meet our combined requirement.
Local streets have more stringent requirements. Though
longitudinal requirements are tighter, equation (18) is still a
reasonable approximation of how errors scale. Since the lateral
alert limit in these conditions is 0.33 meters for passenger
vehicle limits (see Table VIII), we require nearly a threefold
improvement compared to freeway design numbers. This puts
us around 0.5 degrees of orientation error δλ which leads
to an error contribution of 0.05 meters when scaled by lv .
This leaves us with an allowable lateral position error δlat of
0.29 meters.
Using design equations (16-18) as a guide, along with the
geometric bounds given in Table VIII representing the total
combined alert limits, bounds for position and orientation
errors can be produced. To overload notation, we will also refer
to these position and orientation bounds as alert limits. Using
these numbers, we can obtain an approximation for the 95%
accuracy requirements by assuming a Gaussian distribution.
Though the error distribution of the localization system may
not be Gaussian, when thinking of this in Gaussian terms,
(1 – 10-8) is 99.999999% or approximately 5.73σ. This gives
us a sense when evaluating localization technologies of what
statistics we should be looking for in terms of metrics like
95% accuracy performance (1.96σ). In other words, when
deriving hard error bounds (the alert limits) on localization
requirements to a degree of certainty of (1 – 10-8) we will
take 95% (1.96σ) accuracy as approximately one third of this
number since 1.96σ / 5.73σ = 1 / 2.92. This relationship is
shown visually in Figure 19 for lateral freeway positioning
requirements. Ultimately, there will be other considerations
on the distribution of localization errors including smoothness
of output and additional parameters such as acceleration and
jerk which are relevant to controlling the vehicle for passenger
comfort [49], [50].
Putting all of the information developed so far together,
requirements can be broken down by road type and operation.
The requirements for freeways and interchanges are summa-
rized in Table IX for a variety of vehicles ranging from mid-
size to large ‘dualie’ pickup trucks. This includes position
and attitude alert limits, 95% accuracy, and the integrity
requirements developed in Section II. The requirements for
local roads are summarized in Table X for passenger vehicles.
Though speeds are lower, the road geometry is tighter, leading
to more stringent requirements on localization.
These results indicate that highway operations will require
lateral accuracies in the 0.2 meters (95%) range, a conclusion
Fig. 19. The desired error distribution for lateral positioning on freeways for
passenger vehicle dimension limits, assuming a Gaussian distribution. This
shows the 95% accuracy at 0.20 meters and hard error bound at 0.57 m at
99.999999% which is a probability of (1 – 10-8).
which matches the requirements for lane departure warning
systems [21], [51]. Longitudinal and vertical requirements are
more forgiving, with numbers in the 0.4 meters (95%) range,
with pointing requirements in each direction of 0.5 degrees
(0.01 radians) (95%). Operations on local roads require lateral
and longitudinal accuracies in the 0.1 meters (95%) range with
pointing requirements of 0.17 degrees (3 milliradians) (95%).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The localization requirements for autonomous vehicles rep-
resent the next order of magnitude in accuracy needs for
widespread deployment. Here, localization requirements in
terms of accuracy, integrity, and latency were developed
based on vehicle dimensions, road geometry standards, and
a target level of safety. Integrity risk allocation leveraged the
approach taken in civil aviation where similar requirements on
localization are derived at 10-8 probability of failure per hour
of operation. Combining this with road geometry standards,
requirements emerge for different road types and operation.
For passenger vehicles operating on freeways, the result is
a required lateral error bound of 0.57 m (0.20 m, 95%), a
longitudinal bound of 1.40 m (0.48 m, 95%), a vertical bound
of 1.30 m (0.43 m, 95%), and an attitude bound in each di-
rection of 1.50 deg (0.51 deg, 95%). On local streets, the road
geometry makes requirements more stringent where lateral and
longitudinal error bounds of 0.29 m (0.10 m, 95%) are needed
with an orientation requirement of 0.50 deg (0.17 deg, 95%).
It should be emphasized that these requirements are not for
one particular localization method or technology, but for the
system comprised of many pieces. In addition, the system must
meet both 95% accuracy requirements and safety integrity
level requirements in all weather and traffic conditions where
operation is intended. Demonstrating the desired integrity
levels cannot be proven by vehicle testing alone, where reason-
able sized testing fleets would have to be driven for potentially
decades to obtain the necessary data [52]. Hence, innovative
certification solutions may be necessary [52], [53]. In addition,
the localization requirements presented here are with respect to
knowledge of where roads and lanes are in the world. Hence,
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TABLE IX
LOCALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR US FREEWAY OPERATION WITH INTERCHANGES. THIS ASSUMES MINIMUM LANE WIDTHS OF 3.6 METERS AND
ALLOWABLE SPEEDS UP TO 137 KM/H (85 MPH).
Vehicle Type
Accuracy (95%) Alert Limit Prob. of Failure
(Integrity)Lateral
[m]
Long.
[m]
Vertical
[m]
Attitude*
[deg]
Lateral
[m]
Long.
[m]
Vertical
[m]
Attitude*
[deg]
Mid-Size 0.24 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.72 1.40 1.30 1.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
Full-Size 0.23 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.66 1.40 1.30 1.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
Standard Pickup 0.21 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.62 1.40 1.30 1.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
Passenger Vehicle
Limits 0.20 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.57 1.40 1.30 1.50
10-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
6-Wheel Pickup 0.14 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.40 1.40 1.30 1.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
*Error in each direction (roll, pitch, and heading).
TABLE X
LOCALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR US LOCAL ROADS. THIS ASSUMES LANES 3.0 METERS WIDE WITH A MINIMUM CURVATURE OF 20 METERS OR
3.3 METERS WIDE WITH MINIMUM CURVATURE OF 10 METERS.
Vehicle Type
Accuracy (95%) Alert Limit Prob. of Failure
(Integrity)Lateral
[m]
Long.
[m]
Vertical
[m]
Attitude*
[deg]
Lateral
[m]
Long.
[m]
Vertical
[m]
Attitude*
[deg]
Mid-Size 0.15 0.15 0.48 0.17 0.44 0.44 1.40 0.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
Full-Size 0.13 0.13 0.48 0.17 0.38 0.38 1.40 0.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
Standard Pickup 0.12 0.12 0.48 0.17 0.34 0.34 1.40 0.50 10
-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
Passenger Vehicle
Limits 0.10 0.10 0.48 0.17 0.29 0.29 1.40 0.50
10-9 / mile
(10-8 / hour)
*Error in each direction (roll, pitch, and heading).
these requirements are with respect to the map. The map will
also have its own uncertainty σmap with respect to the global
reference, e.g. the WGS-84 datum, as also discussed in [51].
The relationship between the vehicle’s localization uncertainty
in the global frame σglobal, its localization uncertainty relative
to the map σrelative, and the uncertainty of the map itself σmap
with respect to the global frame is given by the following:
σ2global = σ
2
relative + σ
2
map (19)
Well geo-referenced maps tied to global datums such as
WGS-84 will likely be necessary for interoperability of maps
between potentially many map suppliers. These maps can
be made with survey-grade equipment and post-processing
and could have errors much less than the real-time vehicle
localization requirements.
What has been presented here are localization requirements
based on the limiting road geometry. Additional requirements
based on operational and other constraints will continue to
evolve, but this provides a baseline. These geometrical con-
straints represent the worst cases; with a-priori highly detailed
maps of the environment, the road geometry will be known
and hence localization resources can be adjusted on the fly
to meet demand and could even be a layer in the map itself.
Achieving these requirements represents challenges in sensor
and algorithm development along with multi-modal sensor
fusion to obtain the reliability levels needed for safe operation.
Some techniques involving LiDAR, radar, and cameras rely
on a-priori maps and give map-relative position. Others such
as GNSS give global absolute position. Combining these and
other technologies and selecting those most appropriate for the
desired level of autonomous operation in a way that ensures
integrity for safe operation is the challenge that lays ahead.
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